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This paper investigates how risk coping strategies differ between idiosyncratic and covariate
income shocks using evidence from a nation-wide flood in Bangladesh. It is found that
availability of coping strategies significantly depends on the covariate-idiosyncratic
characteristic of shocks. The main strategies for idiosyncratic and moderate covariate shocks
are interest-free informal credit and additional labor supply for fishing, but they are not
utilized to cope with the severe covariate shocks. Instead, people must resort to borrowing
with high interest as a last resort.
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1. Introduction
People in the developing world frequently face various shocks such as natural disasters and 
unemployment.  These  shocks  are  categorized  into  two  groups  depending  on  the  extent  of 
damages: covariate shocks and idiosyncratic shocks. The former affects the whole community
such as villages, while the latter affects individuals or households. Impacts on victims’ livelihood 
could be different between them, implying needs for different policy interventions.
When economic hardships occur in developing countries, people resort to various risk coping 
strategies to smooth consumption, since formal credit and insurance markets are less developed
1. 
However, these strategies still may not work perfectly (Townsend 1994, Kazianga and Udry 
2006); negative  income  shocks  could lower  consumption  significantly,  causing transitory
poverty
2. Jalan and Ravallion (1998) show that the poverty in rural China could be halved if
transitory poverty is solved through improvement  of access to credit and insurance markets. 
Therefore, it is important to examine how people ensure livelihoods during negative shocks.
This paper aims to reveal differences in risk coping strategies between idiosyncratic and 
covariate shocks using  evidence from  Bangladesh.  Previous studies  claim  the importance  of
examining  not  only  idiosyncratic  but  also  covariate  shocks to  better  understand  households’
attitude toward risks (Dercon 2002, Skoufias 2003). This would be helpful in suggesting efficient 
poverty  reduction  programs,  since  the  government  provides  safety  net  programs  mainly  for 
covariate shocks. However, most studies investigate only household-level idiosyncratic shocks, 
and there are few studies that compare covariate and idiosyncratic shocks (Ersado et al. 2003, 
Handa and King 2003, Takasaki et al. 2004).
This study attempts to contribute to the research on this subject in the following ways. First,
this study examines risk coping strategy choice. People in the third world combine multiple 
strategies  depending  on  the  characteristics  of  households  and  shocks,  but  few  researchers 
conduct studies from this perspective (Rosenzweig 2001). This paper bridges the gap in the 
existing literature by considering five major risk coping strategies. The second contribution is to
explicitly reveal the availability and limitation of risk coping strategies in regards to the type of 
shocks. Interest-free informal credit is used as informal mutual insurance, and it shares a major 
part  of  the  literature  of  risk  coping  strategies  (Platteau  and  Abraham  1987,  Udry  1994,
Fafchamps and Lund 2003, Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). This study finds that the availability of 
such credit significantly depends on whether the shock is covariate or idiosyncratic, and people 
                                                  
1  Risk coping strategies include, for example, interest-free informal credit, additional labor 
supply, sales of assets, and so forth (Dercon 2002, 2005; Fafchamps 2003). The literature of risk 
coping strategies is briefly reviewed in the next section.
2  Poverty is classified as being either chronic or transitory. If a household is poor in every period, 
it is chronic poverty. Otherwise, it is transitorily poor (Morduch 1994). Transitory poverty is 
largely caused by less developed credit and insurance markets.2
must borrow with high interest rates when severe covariate shocks occur.
2. The 1998 Flood in Bangladesh and Dataset
Bangladesh is a flood-prone country. The timing of floods is considered exogenous because it 
depends on the timing and the amount of rainfall. Therefore, it is hard to predict the level of 
flooding beforehand, exacerbating the damage. Floods are clearly the most important risk for 
agricultural households in determining the amount of inputs. The nation-wide flood disasters in
1988, 1998, 2004, and 2007 caused severe damage to micro and macro economies.
The flood in 1998 was particularly severe in terms of both damage per household and the 
number of affected households. It began in the first week of July and continued until the middle 
of September, affecting 68% of the country. Since it began after the planting period of the main 
crop for the rainy season,  most of the standing crop was damaged (del Ninno, et al. 2001).
Although  the  flood  significantly  declined  households’  livelihoods  on  average,  the  level  of 
damage varied across villages and even between households within the same village. Therefore, 
floods affect households as both covariate and idiosyncratic shocks. Damages from the 1998
flood are discussed in detail below with summary statistics.
This study utilizes a micro panel dataset of 757 households, collected by the International 
Food  Policy  Research  Institute  (IFPRI).  The  dataset  was  surveyed to  study  the  1998  flood 
impacts on households. It covers three waves: December 1998, June 1999, and November 1999. 
However, this paper only employs the first and third waves of the data to eliminate seasonal 
effects; in agricultural areas like rural Bangladesh, households’ preference of consumption and 
saving varies according to seasons.
This  dataset  follows  the  multistage  stratified  random  sampling  methodology  for  seven
districts that were selected depending on their economic status and the severity of the flood
damage. In the second stage, one Thana from each district and three unions from each of them
were randomly chosen
3. In the next stage, approximately six villages from each union and two
clusters  from  each  of  the  villages  were  randomly  picked  out. Finally,  approximately three
households from each cluster were chosen depending on the village size (del Ninno et al. 2001).
This dataset has interesting features to examine the covariate shocks and the risk coping 
strategies.  An  appropriate  estimation  of  covariate  shock  impacts  requires  both  large
community-sample size and variation in flood damages across communities. To that extent, this
dataset is suitable since it includes 126 villages sampled from widely scattered areas. Another 
advantage of this data is the availability of the flood impacts on the local communities such as 
                                                  
3 “Thana” and “union” are administration units of Bangladesh; a union consists of some villages, 
and each Thana includes multiple unions.3
damage to infrastructure and access to market.
Summary Statistics and Literature Reviews 
Table 1 describes the community-level and household-level damages caused by the 1998 flood.
Community-level  damages  were  surveyed  from  each  union. Damage  to  transportation 
infrastructure was remarkably severe; around 90% of communities experienced damage to roads
and/or bridges. The flood also affected culverts severely, but damages to irrigation and canal
infrastructure  were  moderate; only  30%  of  communities  experienced  damage.  In  terms  of
household level damages, 89% of agricultural fields were covered with flood water. Also, in 67% 
of houses, floors were covered with flood water. 
Table 2 illustrates declines in labor income during floods and increases in uses of risk coping 
strategies for  the  flood  damage.  Labor  income  includes  agricultural  income  from  plots, 
agricultural  and  nonagricultural  wage  labor  income,  and  nonagricultural  self-employment
business income. It does not include income from fishing, since price data of fish is not available. 
Seasonal labor income during the flood was 20% lower than in 1999, one year after the flood. 
The variance of income was also higher in 1998, implying that vulnerability to disasters varied
across households.
To cope with the negative income shock in 1998, people borrowed from various sources: 
banks, Microfinance, interest-free credit from informal sources such as relatives and neighbors, 
and informal credit with interest. Interest-free credit is used as informal insurance in village 
economies (Udry 1994, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). In addition to 
this, many households borrowed with interest during the flood period. Informal lenders charged 
around 50% interest rates during the flood, which is much higher than those of formal banks and 
MFIs. The  amount  of  informal  credit  with  interest  was  higher  during  the  flood,  while
interest-free credit was less active at that time than in 1999. 
Panel  C  reports  that  time  allocation  for  fishing  was  remarkably  high  during  the  flood. 
Additional labor supply to smooth income is an important risk coping strategy (Morduch 1995; 
Kochar 1999). Fishing can be considered as an important source of income when agricultural 
fields are covered with flood water. Although access to agricultural work is lost, it becomes
easier to catch fish during floods
4. The final major coping strategy is dissaving of assets such as 
livestock and crop storage (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Udry 1995; Fafchamps et al. 1998;
Kazianga and Udry 2006). The table shows that livestock transactions are used less frequently 
than crop dissaving.
                                                  
4  Takasaki et al. (2004) find that people affected by covariate shocks are more likely to increase 
time allocation for fishing and to extract common resources such as firewood.4
3. Empirical Methodology
This  section  develops  the  empirical  methodology  to  examine in risk  coping  strategies  for 
covariate and idiosyncratic shocks. Although this paper mainly focuses on coping strategies for 
community-wide  covariate  income  fluctuation,  I  begin  with  discussion  of  household-level
idiosyncratic income shock. The following equation based on the full insurance hypothesis test is 
considered (Townsend 1994, Ravallion and Chaudhuri 1997);
1 3 2 1 1 0 1           t t t t e Z X Y s     , (1)
where, ϶ indicates the first difference operator, s the amount of each risk coping strategy, Y
labor  income,  and  X  other  control  variables  for  households’  heterogeneity  in  preference, 
endowment and access to credit market: demographic variables, household head characteristics
and  size  of  agricultural  fields. Finally,  Z  is  a  village  fixed-effect  variable  to  control  for
village-level heterogeneity. In this specification, 1  indicates the effect of idiosyncratic income 
fluctuations on coping strategies, since the covariate component of income shock is absorbed in 
the village fixed effect.
A  concern  related  to  the  specification  is  endogeneity  of  income,  since  households  make 
decisions  regarding  coping  strategies  and  income  earning  activities  simultaneously.  Suitable 
instrumental  variables  must  satisfy  two  conditions.  They  must  be  correlated  with  income 
fluctuations and orthogonal to the residuals in the risk coping strategies. Exogenous factors to 
explain production technology would satisfy these criteria. 
This  study  employs  the  following  instrumental  variables:  flood  damage  to  irrigation 
infrastructure and fertilizer shops, depth of flood water in agricultural fields, and its square term
5. 
Justification of these instruments is based on Paxson (1993), who uses access to irrigation system 
to control for endogeneity between consumption and income level. The idea is that the access to 
irrigation and fertilizer affects incomes, but affects coping strategies only through the impact on 
income.  That  is,  they  do  not  change  households’ decisions  about  coping  strategies  directly. 
Similarly, the depth of flood water in the fields affects agricultural income, but would not change 
people’s decisions directly. Finally, I use the square term of the flood depth to control for the 
non-linear  effect  of  inundation  on  harvest,  since  moderate  floods  could  increase  harvests.  I 
discuss the justification of instruments in detail at the appendix A1.
Table A2 at the appendix shows results from the first stage regression. This study runs the 
regressions of income level of each year as well as the first difference. They are estimated using 
cluster-adjusted  standard  errors  to  address  the  correlation  of  residuals  within  villages.  The 
bottom of the third column rejects the possibility of the weak instruments.
                                                  
5  This paper uses the number of damaged irrigation systems divided by the number of 
households living in the Union community as the instrument to control for heterogeneity in 
community size.5
Measuring Covariate Shocks
Equation (1) is not adequate to examine covariate shocks because the covariate component of 
income fluctuation is absorbed in the village fixed effect. Therefore, this study introduces an 
alternative approach following Campbell et al. (2001)
6. More specifically, this study decomposes
the fitted value of income fluctuations from the first stage regression in Table A2, 1 ˆ
  t Y , into 
union-level  and  village-level  covariate  income  fluctuations  and  household-level  idiosyncratic 
fluctuations:
            1 1 1 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
                 t V t t U t V t U t Y E Y Y E Y E Y E Y (2)
where    1 ˆ
  t U Y E and    1 ˆ
  t V Y E   denote  the  average  of estimated  income  fluctuation  within 
each union and village, respectively. Finally, this study estimates the following equation:
       
    1 4 1 1 3
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This specification illustrates the impact of covariate shocks on coping strategies by comparing 
1  , 2  , and 3  . Note that  1  reflects the effect of more severe covariate shock than  2  in 
terms of the extent of affected areas, and 3    reports impacts of idiosyncratic income fluctuation.
If choices of risk coping strategies are not influenced by the covariate-idiosyncratic nature of the 
shock,  these  three  coefficients  should  be the  same
7. A  potential  concern  in  this  approach is 
associated with the possibility of bias caused by omitted community-level heterogeneity, since it 
does  not  include  community-level  fixed  effect  variables. This  is  addressed  in  detail  at  the 
appendix.
4. Estimation Results
This section discusses the estimation results of Equation (3)
8. I estimate five major risk coping 
                                                  
6 Campbell et al. (2001) employs this specification to examine the volatility of common stock at 
the market, industry and firm level.
7 Fafchamps and Lund (2003) show that the poor in Philippines form small risk-sharing groups 
with a few members rather than the whole village. This study considers villages as a unit of 
community because of the unavailability of data for the group formation. Another reason is that 
the mean income levels of such small groups are considered endogenous, since people 
endogenously choose the group members (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007).
8  It might be straightforward to use the Friction Model estimation (Maddala 1986), given that 
the dependent variables of some observations take the value of zero. However, I employ the 
Linear Regression model because the sample size of the dataset is small.6
strategies: interest-free informal credit, informal credit with interest, labor supply for fishing, 
saving of crop and livestock assets. Credit transactions from informal sources such as relatives 
and landlords are categorized  as interest-free  informal  credit if interest  is  not  charged or  as 
informal credit with interest, otherwise. Labor supply for fishing is the seasonal working hours 
allocated to fishing. Crop saving and livestock saving indicate the net of purchase, consumption, 
and sales of paddy and rice, and bullock and cattle, respectively.
Table 3 shows distinctions in the risk coping strategies between idiosyncratic and covariate 
income fluctuations
9. First, the first column shows that a decrease in idiosyncratic income is 
associated with an increase in interest-free credit; people use interest-free credit for idiosyncratic 
shocks, consistent with previous studies (Udry 1994, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, Fafchamps and 
Gubert  2007). Coefficients  of  idiosyncratic  shock  in  the  other  columns  are  statistically 
insignificant,  while  the  signs  of  parameters  are  consistent  with  the  consumption  smoothing 
model, implying that interest-free credit is the major strategy to cope with idiosyncratic shocks.
Second, however, interest-free credit is not useful when all community members suffer from 
flood damage. The absolute value of the coefficient of village-level covariate shocks is smaller 
than that of idiosyncratic shocks, although it is still marginally significant
10. Instead, people use
other strategies to  cope with  covariate shocks. The third  column shows that affected people 
increase time allocation for fishing to compensate for the income loss. A 100 Taka (Tk) decline 
in average income increases the time allocated to fishing by 7.54 hours for the average villager. 
If an individual had worked as a casual wage laborer during the flood period while the average 
daily income from casual labor was 38.6 Tk, he would have earned 36.4 Tk in 7.5 hours
11.
Third, when households face union-level severe covariate shocks, they are no longer able to 
use quasi-credit. People still catch fish to smooth income, but the absolute value coefficient is 
smaller  than  that  of  village-level  covariate  shock.  The  decline  in  fishing  activity  might  be 
because more people attempt to catch fish under more severe covariate shocks, resulting in a 
decline in the marginal productivity of fishing and also causing a decline in the market price of 
fish. This in turn decreases the amount of labor supply, given that the marginal productivity is 
                                                  
9  Although the original sample size of the data is 757, this study is able to utilize data from 641 
households because of missing data mainly for the damage to irrigation infrastructure. A
specification without the irrigation damage variable obtains the similar results.
10  The table shows that a 1000 Tk of decreases in idiosyncratic income increases the amount of 
quasi-credit by 2255 Tk, while that of village-level covariate income increases it by 1733 Tk. 
Consumption smoothing behavior expects the coefficients range from -1000, if a shock is 
completely insured using quasi-credit, to zero in case it is not used to smooth consumption at all. 
The coefficients of point estimate are counter-intuitively large, but the upper-bounds of 90% 
confidence intervals of idiosyncratic and village-level shocks are -843 and -122, respectively (not 
reported in tables); both fit in the expected range.
11  It assumes that casual workers work 8 hours per day.7
sufficiently low. 
Fourth, the coefficient of the union-level covariate shock in the second column indicates that
people cope with 65% of the severe covariate shock by utilizing credit with high interest. People 
borrow  with  high  interest  only  when  the  other  strategies  are  costly  or  unavailable.  This  is 
consistent  with  the  finding  by  Kochar  (1995)  that  credit  from  moneylenders  is  a  more 
burdensome  strategy  than  increasing  labor  supply.  Under  severe  covariate  shocks,  affected 
households borrow with high interest rates as a last resort.
Finally, it is tested whether the coefficients of idiosyncratic and severe covariate shocks are 
the same for each strategy. The table shows statistically significant differences between the two 
coefficients in the equations of interest-free credit and informal credit with interest, strengthening
the robustness of the findings.
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This  study  reveals  differences  in consumption  smoothing  behavior  between  covariate  and 
idiosyncratic shocks using evidence from the 1998 flood in Bangladesh. While the government 
provided the poor with safety nets such as food relief and workfare programs, victims still had to 
take risk coping strategies in order to smooth consumption. I find that while people mainly use 
interest-free credit to cope with the idiosyncratic shock, in the face of village-level covariate 
shock  such  credit  transactions  become  inactive. Instead,  people  get  involved  in  fishing  to 
compensate for the loss. When more severe covariate shocks occur, people are no longer able to 
borrow  without  interest,  and  fishing  activity  is  reduced  perhaps  because  of  declines  in 
productivity. Therefore, people must resort to borrowing from informal lenders with high interest 
rates. 
These findings suggest the importance of credit markets for people to ensure their livelihoods.
A possible intervention is the promotion of MFIs, which have been playing an important role in
improving  access  to  credit  for  the  poor (Aghion  and  Morduch  2005;  Khandker  2007). An 
alternative policy is the provision of workfare programs. As this paper finds, people in the face of 
negative shocks attempt to allocate time resources to additional labor in order to compensate for 
the  income  loss.  This  does  not,  however,  guarantee  perfect  income  recovery  under  severe 
covariate shocks, since marginal productivity of labor decreases. If the central government and 
NGOs  provide  workfare  programs  which  secure  a  certain  wage  level,  it  would  help  people
overcome community-wide hardships. 
Appendix 1: Further Discussion of the Instrumental Variables
As  for  the  choice  of  instrumental  variables,  one  might  argue  that  floods  could  decline  the 
marginal productivity of land, affecting collateral value of land assets, which in turn deteriorates 8
access to formal and informal credit markets. If this is the case, the instrumental variables –
damage to irrigation, fertilizer shops, and owned fields – would be correlated to the estimation 
residuals, violating the exclusion restriction. Unfortunately, the standard identification test of 
instrumental variables is not available because of the decomposition approach in the estimation.
Therefore, I use the change in the price of land assets between flood and non-flood period to 
address  the  concern.  The  dataset  records  145  transactions  of  purchase  and  inheritance  of 
agricultural plots since 1995. This enables us to examine the dynamics of collateral value of land 
assets through time. Panel A of Table A1 compares average unit price of fields in 1998 to that of 
pre-flood period from 1995 until 1997. The mean difference test does not reject the null that 
average unit prices are the same between the two periods.
One might, however, be concerned by the possibility of sample selection bias in the tests, 
since land prices are observed only when fields are transacted. If prices of some fields declined, 
and  the  land  owners  avoided  selling  their  land  during  the  floods,  the  reported  statistics 
overestimate  the  actual  average  land  price  of  the  floods  periods.  To  address  this  potential 
problem, this paper attempts two tests. The first is a mean difference test using only observations 
of inherited land. Since the timing of inheritance is exogenous, unlike that of purchase, the price 
dynamics of inherited land are free from the sample selection issue. Panel B shows the results of 
mean difference tests, and it does not reject the null.
The second attempt is the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Smirnov 1939, Gail 
and Green 1976). If the sample selection bias is true, the lower side of density function of unit 
price would be truncated. Hence, the cumulative density functions would be different between 
the two periods, even if the mean levels are the same. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test examines
the difference in cumulative density functions between two groups. The table shows that it does 
not  reject  the  null  that  the  cumulative  density  functions  are  the  same,  strengthening  the 
justification of the instrumental variables.
Appendix 2: Robustness Check: Omitted Village-Level Heterogeneity
This  subsection  addresses  the  possibility  of  biased  estimation  caused  by  omitted 
community-level variables, because Equation (3) does not include community-level fixed effects. 
Also, the decomposition of income fluctuation might show a biased result if measurement error 
of community-level average income is significant. Since the dataset includes only six households 
from each village, there might be a gap between the actual mean income shock and the one 
calculated from the observations. 
Therefore,  this  subsection  attempts  estimation  of  Equation  (1)  with  a  village-level  fixed 
effect. Although this specification does not identify impacts of covariate shocks, it consistently 
estimates impacts of idiosyncratic shocks. If the above-mentioned econometric problems are not 9
crucial,  it  should  show  a  similar  result  to  the  main  specification  as  for  the  coefficients  of 
idiosyncratic shock. Panel A of Table A3 reports estimated coefficients of idiosyncratic-income 
fluctuation, 1  . It shows similar findings; again, people mainly use interest-free credit to cope 
with idiosyncratic shocks. The coefficients in the other equations are insignificant.
Appendix 3: Robustness Check II: Omitted Flood-Damage Variables
The previous specifications investigate only income shocks caused by the flood. However, floods 
affect  households  through  various  aspects  such  as  damage  to  productive  assets  and  health 
conditions. Omitting these variables might cause a biased estimation. This section, therefore,
shows results from a specification with another covariate: the duration of inundation at home. 
This affects the households’ health condition and productive assets, and therefore controls for the 
effect of the flood on damage to human and physical assets. Table 1 shows that almost two thirds 
of houses got inundated with flood water. The results are reported at Panel B of Table A3, and are 
similar to those in Table 3.
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Fertilizer Shop (days) 27.90
(26.78) 60.9%
Household  Level  Damage













Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 2: Dynamics of Livelihood and Coping Strategies
Rainy Season in 1998 Rainy Season in 1999
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Panel A: Livelihood
Seasonal labor income (Tk) 4601.3 (6413.5) 5724.2 (5334.6)
Weight for height ratio
-Males under 10 0.138 (0.025) 0.166 (0.462)
-Females under 10 0.132 (0.028) 0.143 (0.028)
-Females aged 10 to 29 0.248 (0.049) 0.258 (0.047)
-Females over 30 0.271 (0.037) 0.275 (0.039)
Panel B: Coping Strategies (Credit)
Interest-free informal credit (Tk) 919.8 (2612.0) 1413.2 (8585.9)
Informal credit with interest (Tk) 624.5 (2117.4) 357.9 (2064.6)
Annual interest rates in informal 
credit (%)
48.66 (31.68) 51.16 (36.35)
Credit from Banks (Tk) 609.4 (2567.0) 186.0 (1326.4)
Credit from MFIs (Tk) 525.8 (2175.4) 395.4 (1716.0)
Panel C: Other Coping Strategies
Seasonal time allocation to fishing 
(Hrs)
128.47 (314.62) 29.86 (83.07)
Crop Saving (Tk) -2091.22 (4415.63) -487.23 (2838.24)
Livestock Saving (Tk) -121.20 (1059.93) 59.82 (1521.15)13
Table 3: Coping Strategies for Covariate and Idiosyncratic Shocks: Equation (3) 





Labor Hours to 
Catch Fish (Hrs)
Livestock Saving
(Tk) Crop Saving (Tk)
1  : Union-level severe 
















2  : Village-level moderate 






































































































































































H0:  3 1    3.01* 3.92* 0.02 1.61 0.02
Observations 641 641 641 641 641
Standard errors based on SURE estimation are in parentheses, and village-level-cluster-adjusted robust standard errors are in brackets.
*** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant, respectively
Table A1: Justification of the Instrumental Variables
N Mean S.E.
Panel A: Purchase and Inheritance
Non-Flood Period 117 1702 127.2
Flood Period 28 1556 188.4





Non-Flood Period 70 1478 163.2
Flood Period 11 1407 292.7




#: P-values are reported.15
Table A2: First Stage Regression
Dependent Variable:
Labor Income in Rainy Season (Tk)






















































































































Observations 653 651 651
R
2 0.16 0.14 0.08
H0: Coefficients of IVs are 
jointly zero 5.49*** 9.06*** 1.99*
Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant, respectively16
Table A3: Coping Strategies for Covariate and Idiosyncratic Shocks: Robustness Check






Labor Hours to 
Catch Fish (Hrs)
Livestock Saving
(Tk) Crop Saving (Tk)













Observations 641 641 641 641 641
Panel B: Equation (3)
1  : Union-level severe 
















2  : Village-level moderate 

































Days Flood Covered Floor 
















Test:  3 1    3.76* 3.94** 0.03 3.11* 0.00
Observations 641
Standard errors based on SURE estimation are in parentheses, and village-level-cluster-adjusted robust standard errors are in brackets.
*** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant, respectively